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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
or sale of securities, where the defendant earned his livelihood from subcription
rates. Here, the publishing of the book by respondent corporation could not be
deemed in reality a mere incident to its corporate business. After all, its
registering with the Securities and Exchange Commission was an admission of
the scope of its business activities.
The extent of the investigative powers of the Attorney General, as
interpreted in a handful of decisions relating to the Martin Act, is relatively
broad in view of the equities involved. 67 In determining whether sufficient
facts are shown warranting an order to produce records, courts should not
require the measure of proof necessary at a trial. How much evidence is
essential the Court of Appeals does not intimate, but in light of the purpose
of the Martin Act, i.e., to protect the unwary public from possible fraudulent
practices in the securities area, it would appear that very little proof will be
required to warrant such an order.
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The New York Legislature has expressed in various statutes the general
intent that a local governmental official shall not be interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract to which the governmental unit is a party.68 It has
specifically provided that a village official shall not "act as such in any matter
or proceeding involving the acquisition of real property then owned by him
for a public improvement. '"69 In Baker v. Marley, 0 the mayor participated
in meetings of the Board of Trustees which adopted resolutions leading to the
condemnation of various parcels of real estate, one of which was owned by the
mayor. The extent of the mayor's interest in the total property condemned for
a municipal parking lot amounted to less than 1%, and he agreed to donate the
$253 proceeds to the village. The mayor's interest in the property was wholly
coincidental and his vote was not necessary for the adoption of the resolutions.
In an action to have the resolutions declared void, the complaint was
dismissed at Special Term. This action was affirmed in the Appellate Division. 71
The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed and held the resolutions
void. The Court found that the resolutions and actions of the Board in
connection with the acquisition of the property were "matters or proceedings"
which involved the mayor in conflicts of interest which the Legislature had
intended to prevent. Thus the resolutions were unlawful, 72 in which case
67. See People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926). (Where
the meaning of fraud within the statute was interpreted to include both intentional and
equitable or implied fraud.)
68. E.g., N.Y. Gen. City Law § 3; N.Y. Second Class Cities Law § 19; N.Y. Village
Law § 332.
69. N.Y. Village Law § 332.
70. 8 N.Y.2d 365, 208 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1960).
71. 9 A.D.2d 894, 195 N.Y.S.2d 599 (4th Dep't 1960).
72.

Cf. Clarke v. Town of Russia, 283 N.Y. 272, 28 N.E.2d 833 (1940).
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"[p] ublic policy forbids the sustaining of municipal action founded upon the
vote of a member of the municipal governing body in any matter before it
which directly or immediately affects him individually." 73 The resolution,
therefore, were void, even though the vote of the mayor was not required for
their passage7 4
This policy of interpreting the conflict of interest statutes strictly was
again followed in DePerno v. Dulan,75 also decided this term. Respondent
mayor dismissed petitioner from his position as Chairman of the Municipal
Civil Service Commission based upon an alleged conflict of interest. The conflict
arose because petitioner, was also president of the Teamsters' local which
represented employees in the Municipal Public Works Department. Immediately
after respondent took office as mayor, the business agent of the local requested a
meeting with him to discuss and negotiate an agreement concerning wages,
hours and working conditions of the Public Works employees. Before any
negotiations had taken place, petitioner notified respondent that the summary
replacement of eighty-three Public Works employees with persons chosen by
the Department head violated the Civil Service Law, and the rules of the
Commission. Petitioner was thereupon dismissed.
The action was sustained in the Appellate Division, 70 but the Court of
Appeals reversed holding that there was no conflict of interest. The Court
held that the relevant statutes were applicable only to situations where city
officers may have financial interest, direct or indirect, in a contract with the
city concerning property or services. 7 Since in the present case no contract
had been entered into or even negotiated the proceedings were premature. In
dicta, however, the Court stated, and Chief Judge Desmond concurred on this
point only, that these statutory prohibitions were not intended to embrace
labor negotiations or agreements. Thus, even if there was a contract it would
not give rise to a conflict of interest.
Bd.
TRAFFic ORDER TO BE FILED WITH DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The defendant, in People v. Cll,78 was charged with a violation of subdivision 4 of Section 56 of the former Vehicle and Traffic Law79 for driving on a
state highway in excess of the speed announced by the State Traffic Commission
by a so-called "order." His conviction by a justice of the peace was reversed
by the County Court 0 upon the ground, specifically raised by the defendant,
73. Pyatt v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Dunellen, 9 N.J. 548, 557, 89 A.2d 1, 5
(1952).
74. Beebe v. Board of Supervisors of Sullivan County, 64 Hun 377, 19 N.Y. Supp.
629, aff'd, 142 N.Y. 631, 37 N.E. 566 (1894).
75. 9 N.Y.2d 433, 214 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1961).
76. 11 A.D.2d 904, 205 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (2d Dep't 1959).
77. Supra note 68.
78. 10 N.Y.2d 123, 218 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1961).
79. Now N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180.
80. 26 Misc. 2d 668, 210 N.Y.S.2d 10 (County Ct. 1961).

